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Yakov Babichenko Shahar Dobzinski Noam Nisan
Abstract
We study the following communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly
known graph G. Alice holds fA and Bob holds fB, both are functions that specify a value for
each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum of fA + fB with respect to G, i.e., a vertex v
for which (fA + fB)(v) ≥ (fA + fB)(u) for every neighbor u of v.
Our main result is that finding a local maximum requires polynomial (in the number of
vertices) bits of communication. The result holds for the following families of graphs: three
dimensional grids, hypercubes, odd graphs, and degree 4 graphs. Moreover, we provide an
optimal communication bound of Ω(√N) for the hypercube, and for a constant dimensional
greed, where N is the number of vertices in the graph.
We provide applications of our main result in two domains, exact potential games and
combinatorial auctions. First, we show that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in 2-player N -
action exact potential games requires polynomial (in N) communication. We also show that
finding a pure Nash equilibrium in n-player 2-action exact potential games requires exponential
(in n) communication.
The second domain that we consider is combinatorial auctions, in which we prove that
finding a local maximum in combinatorial auctions requires exponential (in the number of items)
communication even when the valuations are submodular.
Each one of the results demonstrates an exponential separation between the non-deterministic
communication complexity and the randomized communication complexity of a total search
problem.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the communication complexity of local search problems. The general problem
involves a search over some “universe” V , for an element v∗ ∈ V that maximizes, at least “locally”,
some objective function f ∶ V → R. The notion of “locality” is formalized by putting a fixed,
known, neighbourhood structure E on the set of elements, so the requirement of local optimality
is that for all u ∈ V such that (v∗, u) ∈ E we have that f(v∗) ≥ f(u). The notion of local
optimality is interesting from two points of view: first, it captures the outcome of a wide range
of “gradual-improvement” heuristics where the neighbourhood structure represents the types of
gradual improvements allowed, and second, locally-optimal solutions provide a notion of stability,
where the neighborhood structure models the possible “deviations” from stability.
In the context of computational complexity, local search problems are captured by the complex-
ity class PLS [Johnson et al., 1988] which is a subset of the well studied class TFNP (defined in
[Megiddo and Papadimitriou, 1991] and studied, e.g., in [Papadimitriou et al., 1990, Beame et al.,
1998, Daskalakis et al., 2009, Huba´cek et al., 2017]): search problems for which a witness always
exists (“total search problems”) and can by efficiently verified (“in NP”). The problem has also
been widely studied in the model of query complexity where the cost of an algorithm is the number
of black-box queries to the objective function f , from the pioneering work of [Aldous, 1983] on the
Boolean hypercube, to a rather complete characterization of not only the deterministic query com-
plexity but also the randomized and even quantum complexities on any graph [Santha and Szegedy,
2004, Aaronson, 2006, Sun and Yao, 2009].
The interest in analyzing local search from a communication complexity point of view is clear:
in essentially any application, the objective function f is not really given as a “black box” but is
somehow determined by the problem structure. When this structure has any element of distributed
content then communication may become an important bottleneck. The question of how the
information is distributed is key: in the simplest imaginable scenario, the search space V is split
somehow between the (say, two) parties, where each party holds the values f(v) for its subset of
v ∈ V (the fixed commonly known neighbourhood structure still involves all of V ). However, in this
scenario even a global maximum (which is certainly also a local one) can be easily found with a
small amount of communication by each player finding the maximum among his subset, and only
communicating and comparing the maxima of the parties. Thus, for the problem to be interesting
we must split the information f(v) of each vertex between the parties. There are various ways to
do this and the most natural one, conceptually and in terms of applications, is probably to split f
as the sum of two functions fA ∶ V → R and fB ∶ V → R held by Alice and Bob. So we consider the
following problem:
Definition: For a fixed, commonly known graph G = (V,E), the SumLS(G) communication
problem is the following: Alice holds a function fA ∶ V → {1, ...,W}, Bob holds a function fB ∶ V →
{1, ...,W}, and their goal is to find a vertex v∗ ∈ V such that fA(v∗) + fB(v∗) ≥ fA(u) + fB(u) for
all u ∈ V with (v∗, u) ∈ E.
Determining the communication complexity of SumLS on certain families of graphs is easy. For
example, a simple reduction from disjointness shows that the communication complexity of SumLS
on the clique with n vertices is Ω(n). Our main theorem proves optimal lower bounds for several
important families of graphs, all have small degree. The technical challenge is that the non-
deterministic communication complexity of the problem on small degree graphs is clearly low: to
verify that v∗ is a local optimum, Alice and Bob need only communicate the values f(u) and
g(u) for the small number of v∗’s neighbours in the graph (note that the degree of all graphs
that we consider is indeed small: logN or even constant). There are only a few results in the
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communication complexity literature that manage to prove good lower bounds for total problems
where verification is easy, most notably for Karchmer-Wigderson games [Karchmer and Wigderson,
1990, Karchmer et al., 1995, Raz and McKenzie, 1997] and for PPAD-like communication problems
[Babichenko and Rubinstein, 2016, Go¨o¨s and Rubinstein, 2018].
Main Theorem.
1. The communication complexity of local search on the n-dimensional hypercube with N = 2n
vertices is Ω(√N).
2. The communication complexity of local search on a constant-dimension grid with N vertices
is Ω(√N).
3. The communication complexity of local search on a specific family of constant degree graphs
with N vertices is Ω(√N).
4. The communication complexity of local search on the odd graph with N vertices is Ω( 4√N).
We note that all our bounds hold for randomized communication complexity. Interestingly,
the first three bounds are optimal: first, since for these families of graphs an algorithm by Aldous
[1983] finds a local optimum with O(√N) queries in expectation, which clearly implies an analogous
communication algorithm with the same efficiency.
Our proof starts from considering the communication variant of a pebbling game Go¨o¨s and Pitassi
[2014]. D = (V,E) is a known directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the
vertices b ∶ V → {0,1} such that every source is true (b(v) = 1) and every sink is false (b(v) = 0).
The output is a false vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v ∈ V such that b(v) = 0 and
b(u) = 1 for all u ∈ V , (u, v) ∈ E). [Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014] consider the communication variant
of the game which is obtained by distributing the information b(v) ∈ {0,1} of every vertex by a
constant size index-gadget {0,1}3 × [3] → {0,1}. They show that for some constant-degree graph
D with N vertices the communication complexity of the problem is Θ(√N), which is optimal.
Our proof is composed of three steps. The first step shows how to reduce the pebbling game to
a variant of local search on a graph G (VetoLS) where Alice holds the function f and Bob holds
a set of valid vertices. The goal is to find a local maximum in the subgraph that is composed of
the valid vertices.
The second step is the most technically challenging one. We first define a notion of embedding
one graph to the other, and show that if a graph G can be embedded intoH then the communication
of VetoLS(H) is at least that of VetoLS(H). We then show that the graph G obtained in the
previous step can be embedded into each of the families considered in the theorem. This embedding
is quite delicate and uses specifics properties of the graph G, since the number of vertices of G and
H must be almost the same, in order to obtain an optimal bound of Ω(√N) for VetoLS(H),
where N is the number of vertices of H.
Finally, in the third step we show that the communication complexity of VetoLS on any graph
is at least that of local search, thus establishing the theorem.
The constants that are obtained in our theorem are quite big (the dimension of the grid has to be
at least 119, and the degree of the constant degree graph is 36). Thus, we also provide an alternative
proof that obtains better constants, at the cost of a worse communication bound. Specifically, we
show that there exists a specific family of 4-degree graphs for which the communication complexity
of local search is Ω(N c) for some constant c > 0. We also show a lower bound of the form Ω(N c)
for the three dimensional grid N × N × 2. The alternative proof uses the more recent and more
generic “simulation” lemmas that “lift” lower bounds from the query complexity setting to the
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communication complexity setting [Go¨o¨s et al., 2017, 2015, Raz and McKenzie, 1997], instead of
the “simulation” lemma of [Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014] that was developed for specific settings like the
pebbling game. The main technical difficulty that we overcome is that the “combination gadgets”
used in these lemmas (specifically the index function) are very different from the simple sum that
we desire.
We now describe two applications of our basic lower bound. In both applications we study
communication variants of problems that are known to be PLS complete, have low non-deterministic
complexity and, as we show, high communication complexity.
1.1 Potential Games
The communication requirements for reaching various types of equilibria in different types of
games have received a significant amount of recent interest (Babichenko and Rubinstein [2016],
Go¨o¨s and Rubinstein [2018]) as they essentially capture the convergence time of arbitrary dynamics
in scenarios where each player only knows his own utilities (“uncoupled dynamics” [Hart and Mas-Colell,
2003, Hart and Mansour, 2010]) and must “learn” information about the others. Of particular im-
portance here is the class of potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996].
Definition: An n-player game with strategy sets A1, ...,An and utility functions u1, ..., un is an
exact potential game if there exists a single potential function φ ∶ A1 × ⋯ × An → R so that for
every player i, every two strategies ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai and every tuple of strategies a−i ∈ A−i we have that
ui(ai, a−i) − ui(a′i, a−i) = φ(ai, a−i) − φ(a′i, a−i).
The game is an ordinal potential function if there exists a single potential function φ ∶ A1 ×
⋯ ×An → R so that for every player i, every two strategies ai, a′i ∈ Ai and every tuple of strategies
a−i ∈ A−i we have that sign(ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)) = sign(φ(ai, a−i) −φ(a′i, a−i)), i.e., the value of
the potential function increases if and only if the player improves his utility.
The class of exact potential games includes, in particular, all congestion games. A key property
of potential games (exact or ordinal) is that every sequence of better responses converges to an
equilibrium and therefore every potential game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
[Hart and Mansour, 2010] study the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in
ordinal potential games. They consider n-player games where each player has four actions and
show (by a reduction from disjointness) that exponential communication is required to distinguish
between the case where the game is an ordinal potential game (and thus has a Nash equilibrium)
and the case where the game is not a potential game and does not admit any Nash equilibrium.
This immediately implies that finding an equilibrium in games that are guaranteed to have one
takes exp(n) bits of communication.
Does finding an equilibrium become any easier for exact potential games? In [Nisan, 2009b]
it was shown that exponentially many queries are needed to find an equilibrium, but maybe in
the communication model the problem becomes much easier. The technical challenge is again that
the non-deterministic communication complexity of the problem is low, i.e, verifying that a certain
profile is a Nash equilibrium does not require much communication (each player only has to make
sure that he plays his best response). Nevertheless, we provide a ray of hope and show that in
contrast to ordinal potential games, there is a randomized protocol that uses only polylog(∣A∣)
(when ∣A∣ = ∣A1∣ ⋅ ... ⋅ ∣An ∣ is the game size) bits of communication and determines whether the game
is an exact potential game or not.
We then show that although it is easy to recognize whether a game is an exact potential game
or not, finding an equilibrium requires polynomial (in the size of the game) communication (and
in particular exponential in the number of players). These results provide a negative answer to an
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open question posed in [Nisan, 2009a].
Theorem 1. For some constant c > 0, the following problem requires at least N c communication
(even randomized): Alice gets an N ×N matrix uA and Bob gets an N ×N matrix uB, they are
promised that the game defined by these matrices is an (exact) potential game and they must output
a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 2. For some constant c > 0, the following problem requires at least 2cn communication
(even randomized): Alice gets the utility functions of the first n players in a 2n-player 2-action
game. Bob gets the utility functions of the last n players. They are promised that the game defined
by these matrices is an (exact) potential game and they must output a pure Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Our proofs are via reductions from local search on (certain) degree 4 graphs in the two-player
N -action case, and from local search on the hypercube in the 2n-player 2-action case. While the
relation between equilibria of potential games and local maxima is well known and very simple,
the reduction is actually quite subtle. First the neighbourhood structures do not naturally match
(in the two-player case), but more crucially the input to the players here is very limited: only very
specifically related matrices uA and uB give an (exact) potential game, while the lower bounds for
local search were for arbitrary inputs.
We also show that the search for a pure Nash equilibrium in exact potential games can be
formulated as a total search problem: Either find a pure Nash equilibrium (that is guaranteed
to exist in exact potential games) or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not an exact
potential game. Interestingly such a succinct evidence of violation of exact potential property is
guaranteed to exist by [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. As an immediate corollary from our results
we deduce hardness of this total search problem.
1.2 Local Optima in Combinatorial Auctions
Our second application concerns attempts to weaken the global optimality constraints in market
allocations. Consider a combinatorial auction of m indivisible items among n players, each with
his own valuation function vi that gives a real value to every subset of the items. The usual goal
of optimizing social welfare aims to globally maximize ∑i vi(Si) over all allocations (S1, ..., Sn) of
the items.
A corresponding notion of equilibrium is the Walrasian equilibrium, which includes also a vec-
tor of prices p1, ..., pm such that every player receives his globally-optimal set of items at these
prices. While these notions provide very strong guarantees, they are usually “too good to be true”:
Walreasian equilibria only rarely exist and optimizing social welfare is usually infeasible, in essen-
tially any sense of the word, and in particular in the sense of requiring exponential communication
[Nisan and Segal, 2006].
Several papers have tried to relax the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium or similarly view the
allocation problem as a game and analyze the equilibria in this game. In particular, in the model
of simultaneous second price auctions [Christodoulou et al., 2008] it is easy to see that when the
valuations are submodular every allocation that is locally optimal can be part of an equilibrium in
the game, and the same goes for the endowed equilibrium of [Babaioff et al., 2018]. Recall that a
locally optimal allocation in a combinatorial auction is an allocation of the items (S1, . . . , Sn) such
that transferring any single item j ∈ Si to some other player i
′ does not improve the welfare.
Since local optima play a central role in various relaxed notions of equilibria, an obvious ques-
tion is whether they are easy to find. In [Babaioff et al., 2018] it is shown that for some succinctly
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represented submodular valuations it is PLS hard to compute a locally optimal allocation in com-
binatorial auction. Furthermore, in the query model it is shown that finding a locally optimal
allocation is as hard as finding a local maximum in the odd graph. Combining the same reduction
with our communication hardness of local search on the odd graph, we get that:
Theorem 3. The communication complexity of finding a locally optimal allocation between two
players with submodular valuations is 2Ω(n).
2 Local Search over Graphs
In this section we provide communication lower bounds on the communication complexity of local
search over several families of graphs.
Theorem 2.1. The following bound holds for the randomized communication complexity of SumLS:
1. CC(SumLS(G)) = Ω(√N), when G is a specific constant-degree (36) graph with N vertices.
2. CC(SumLS(Hypn)) = Ω(
√
N) = Ω(2n/2) where N = 2n is the number of vertices.
3. CC(SumLS(H) = Ω(√N), when H is a grid with a constant dimension (119) grid with N
vertices.
4. CC(SumLS(Oddn)) = Ω(2n/2).
We note that results 1, 2, and 3 are optimal since Aldous [1983] provides a randomized algorithm
that finds a local maximum in these graph using O(√N) value queries. Result 4, on the other hand,
is not necessarily optimal because the odd graph has N ≈ 4n vertices, so in terms of the number of
vertices our lower bound is Ω( 4√N).
Result 3 proves an optimal bound for a grid with a constant dimension, but this dimension is
quite large (119). We are able to show that finding a local optimum in the three-dimensional grid
is hard, but our lower bound in this case is only Ω(N c), for some constant c > 0 (in contrast to an
optimal bound of Ω(√N) for the 119-dimensional grid). To prove this, we first show that finding
a local maximum is hard even for degree 4 graphs.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that the randomized communication complexity
of SumLS satisfies:
1. CC(SumLS(G)) ≥ N c, when G is a specific degree 4 graph with N vertices.
2. CC(SumLS(GridN×N×[2]) = N c.
The overall structure of the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is similar, but the proofs use different
techniques. The proof of Theorem 2.1 appears in Section 3 and the proof of Theorem 2.2 appears
in Section 4.
3 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Our starting point is a communication variant of a pebbling game. In this problem, D = (V,E) is
a known directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the vertices b ∶ V → {0,1}
such that every source is true (b(v) = 1) and every sink is false (b(v) = 0). The output is a false
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vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v ∈ V such that b(v) = 0 and b(u) = 1 for all u ∈ V ,
(u, v) ∈ E). Note that the problem is total.
The communication variant of the pebbling game Pebb(D) is defined by distributing the in-
formation b(v) ∈ {0,1} of every vertex by a constant size index-gadget {0,1}3 × [3] → {0,1}.
In [Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014] it is shown that there exists a constant degree graph D with N
vertices where both the randomized communication complexity of the problem is Θ(√N). The
proof is done in three steps.
Step 1 We introduce an intermediate communication problem VetoLS(G) where Alice holds the
potential function and Bob holds a subset of valid vertices (equivalently, Bob vetoes the vertices
that are not in the set that he holds). The goal is to find a valid local maximum: a valid vertex
whose valid neighbours have (weakly) lower potential. Given a graph D as above, we construct a
constant degree graph G with O(N) vertices and reduce Peb(D) to VetoLS(G). This gives us
an optimal communication lower bound for VetoLS for a concrete graph G.
Step 2 We define a certain notion of “embedding” of one graph into the other. We show that if G′
can be embedded in G, then CC(VetoLS(G′)) ≥ CC(VetoLS(G)). We use this observation to
prove optimal hardness bound of VetoLS over the hypercube by embedding G into an hypercube
of dimension log(N) + c for a constant c.
Step 3 For every graph G, we show that CC(VetoLS(G)) ≈ CC(SumLS(G)).
We now provide a detailed description of each step.
3.1 Starting Point: Pebbling Games
In Section 3.3 we use the concrete structure of the constant degree graph D for which the hardness
of the pebbling game is proved. Hence, we start with providing an explicit description of the graph
D.
The vertices of D are given by V = [M3]× [M]× [M]× [M]. Each vertex v = (k1, k2, k3, k4) has
six successors:
{v + (1,±1,0,0), v + (1,0,±1,0), v + (1,0,0,±1)}
where the ±1 addition in the last three coordinates is done modulo M . The addition in the first
coordinate is the standard addition. Thus, each vertex has six predecessors:
{v + (−1,±1,0,0), v + (−1,0,±1,0), v + (−1,0,0,±1)}
The sources of the graph are {(1, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅)} and its sinks are {(M3, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅)}.
In [Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014] an optimal bound on the communication complexity is proved the
following optimal bound on the communication of the following variant of pebbling games. In the
communication problem Pebb(D), Alice’s input is an assignment b ∶ V × [3] → {0,1}. Bob’s input
is an index for each vertex I ∶ V → [3]. The input satisfies b(v, I(v)) = 1 for every source v, and
b(v, I(v)) = 0 for every sink v. The output is a vertex v ∈ S such that b(v, I(v)) = 0 and for every
predecessor u of v holds b(u, I(u)) = 1.
Theorem 3.1 ([Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014]). CC(Pebb(D)) = Ω(M3). This bound also holds for
randomized protocols.
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3.2 Step 1: From Pebbling to VetoLS
Given a graph G, the communication problem VetoLS(G) is defined as follows. Alice’s input is a
function f ∶ V → [W ]. Bob’s input is a non-empty subset S ⊂ V . The output is a vertex v ∈ S such
that f(v) ≥ f(w) for every w ∈ S such that {v,w} ∈ E (i.e., for every valid neighbour). We show
that the communication complexity of VetoLS(G) is at least that of Pebb(D), for some G that
is related to D. Next we show how to obtain the graph G from D.
We construct the graph G in two stages. First, given a graph D of the pebbling game, let
G′ be an undirected version of D which additionally has an edge from every source of D to some
sink of D. Let G be the graph that is obtained from G′ by replacing each vertex in G with three
new vertices and duplicating the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the copies of its
neighbors in G′. We call the graph G the replication graph of D.
Proposition 3.2. Let D be a graph and G be its replication graph. The communication complexity
of VetoLS(G) is at least that of Pebb(D).
Proof. Let V denote that set of vertices of D and V ′ = V × [3] be the set of vertices of G. Let
t ∶ V ′ → R be a topological numbering of the vertices of G. I.e., t((u, i)) > t((v, j)) if there exists a
directed edge (u, v) in D.
Alice’s input in Pebb(D) is an assignment b ∶ V × [3] → {0,1}. We use this to define the
potential function f that Alice holds in VetoLS(G): for vertex v ∈ V ′ let f(v) = t(v) + 6N1b(v)=0.
Bob’s input in Pebb(D) is the function I ∶ V → [3]. Bob defines the set of valid vertices in
VetoLS(G) to be S = {(v, I(v)) ∶ v ∈ V }. Namely, among the three copies of v only the one with
correct index is valid. This choice of valid vertices has the desirable property that the subgraph
of valid vertices is precisely G′ and the assignment b(v, i) over the vertices of G′ is precisely the
decomposed assignment b(v, I(v)).
We argue that the local maxima of f are precisely all false vertices whose all incoming neighbours
are true. Those are indeed local maxima, because their “predecessors” do not have the bonus of
6N and their “successors” have lower topological number. The source cannot be a local maximum
because it is a “true” vertex and it is connected to a sink that is a “false” vertex. A true vertex
(other than source) is not local maximum because its predecessor has higher topological number.
Similarly, a false vertex with false predecessor is not local maximum. This leaves us only with false
vertices whose predecessors are true.
3.3 Step 2: Embedding the Bounded Degree Graph
In this step we define a certain notion of embedding of one graph into another. We will see that
if a graph G can be embedded into H then the communication complexity of local search on H is
essentially at least as large as the communication complexity of local search on G. We will then see
how to embed the graph G of the previous steps into the three dimensional grid, the hypercube,
and the odd graph.
Definition 3.3. A vertex-isolated edge-disjoint (VIED) embedding of a graph G = (VG,EG) in a
graph H = (VH ,EH) is a pair of mappings ϕ ∶ VG → VH and χ ∶ EG → P (H), where P (H) is the
set of simple paths on H, such that:
• ϕ is injective.
• For every edge {v,w} ∈ EG, the path χ({v,w}) connects ϕ(v) to ϕ(w).
• The interior vertices of the paths χ({v,w}) and χ({v′,w′}) are disjoint (edge disjointness).
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• For every v ∈ VG and every {w,w′} ∈ EG such that v ≠ w,w′ holds d(ϕ(v), χ({w,w′})) ≥ 2,
where d denotes the distance in H of the vertex from the path (vertex isolation).
That is, in a VIED embedding every edge of G is replaced by a path in H that connects the
corresponding vertices such that these paths do not share a vertex. Moreover, for every v ∈ VG,
ϕ(v) is isolated in the sense that no path passes through the neighbours of ϕ(v).
Lemma 3.4. Let G be a graph and suppose it can be VIED embedded into some other graph H.
Then CC(VetoLS(G)) ≤ CC(VetoLS(H)).
Proof. Alice’s potential is defined as follows. For vertices w ∈ ϕ(VG) we define fH(ϕ(v)) = fG(v).
Consider a vertex w ∈ χ(EG) that belongs to an edge {u, v} ∈ EG. Suppose that w is the k’th
element in the path χ({u, v}) and l is the total length of this path. Define:
fH(w) = k
l
fG(u) + l − k
l
fG(v) (1)
In all other vertices Alice’s potential will not play a role because these vertices will not be valid,
thus we can simply set fH(w) ≡ 0 for all other vertices.
We recall that Bob’s input in VetoLS(G) is SG ⊂ VG. We denote by EG(SG) ⊂ EG the set of
internal edges of SG. Bob’s subset of valid vertices in H is defined by
1 SH = ϕ(SG) ∪ χ(EG(SG)).
If v ∈ VG is a valid local maximum, then ϕ(v) ∈ VH is a valid local maximum because all its
valid neighbours are valid edges in which v participates (here we use the isolation property), and
the value along these edges is a weighted average of fG(v) and fG(u) ≤ fG(v), where u is a valid
neighbour of v.
We argue that there are no additional valid local maxima in H. Indeed, if v ∈ VG is not a local
maximum then ϕ(v) ∈ VH is not a local maximum because there is a valid edge where the potential
increases. If w ∈ χ(EG(SG)), by distinctness, fG(u) ≠ fG(v) therefore in one of the directions of
the path χ({u, v}) the potential increases. All other vertices are invalid.
3.3.1 An Explicit Description of the Graph G
In the embeddings we use the specifics of the DAG D for which the hardness of pebbling games
is proved in Go¨o¨s and Pitassi [2014]. We now explicitly describe the replication graph G that is
obtained from D so that Proposition 3.2 can be applied.
Let G′ be the undirected version of the DAG D for which the hardness of pebbling games is
proved with additional edges that connect the sources and sinks of D in a same way other vertices
in D are connected. Formally, the vertices of G′ are V = [M3] × [M] × [M] × [M], and the edges
are:
E = {(u, v) ∶ u − v ∈ {(±1,±1,0,0), (±1,0,±1,0), (±1, 0,0,±1)}}
Let G be the graph that is obtained fromG′ by replacing each vertex in G with three new vertices
and duplicating the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the copies of its neighbors in
G′. Formally, the vertices of G are {(v, i) ∶ v ∈ V, i ∈ [3]} and the edges are {((u, i), (v, j)) ∶ (u, v) ∈
E, i, j ∈ [3]}. Note that G is a graph with 3M6 vertices and (constant) degree d = 36.
1By χ(EG(SG)) we obviously mean the corresponding vertices in these paths.
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3.3.2 Embedding into the Hypercube
In this section we show how to embed the replication graph G obtained in the previous step into
the hypercube. Moreover, the embedding is such that the number of vertices in the hypercube
increases only by a constant factor. This small blowup is crucial for obtaining an optimal 2n/2
bound.
Lemma 3.5. The graph G (with 3M6 vertices) can be VIED-embedded into the n’th-dimensional
hypercube Hypn for n = 6⌈logM⌉ + 111. As a corollary, CC(VetoLS(Hypn)) = Ω(2n/2).
Proof. For clarity of exposition we assume thatM = 2c is a power of 2. We start with some notations
and properties of the graph G. Recall that the vertices ofG are V = [M3]×[M]×[M]×[M]×[3]. For
a vertex v = (k1, k2, k3, k4, i), k1 is called the layer of v. Note that all edges connect k layer vertices
to k+1 layer vertices. k1+k2+k3+k4 mod 2 is called the parity of v. i is called the replication index
of v. We present an edge coloring of G with 108 colors in which no two adjacent edges are colored
the same (a “valid” coloring). We first color all edges from layer 1 to layer 2 with 54 colors. Given
a vertex v = (k2, k3, k4), edges are specified by a displacement d ∈ {±1,0,0), (0,±1, 0), (0, 0,±1)}
that operates on (k2, k3, k4) and pair of replication indices i, j ∈ [3] (i is the replication index of
the vertex at layer 1 and j is the replication index of the vertex at layer 2). Note that we have
6 ⋅ 9 = 54 such specifications. It is easy to verify that coloring these edges in 54 different colors is
a valid edge coloring. We proceed by coloring all edges between layers 2 and 3 with different 54
colors using a similar coloring method. Similarly, all edges from layer 2k − 1 to layer 2k are colored
as edges between layers 1 and 2 and all edges from layer 2k to layer 2k + 1 are colored as edges
between layers 2 and 3. This defines an edge coloring of G.
Now we present some notation. The vertices of the hypercube are partitioned into blocks as
follows:
• For i = 1, ...,5 the i’th index block consists of bits that represent the i’th index. The sizes of
the blocks are (3c, c, c, c,2) for i = 1,2,3,4,5 correspondingly.
• A parity bit memorizes the parity of a vertex.
• The edge block consists of 108 bits.
• The counter block consists of 3 bits that serves as a counter to keep track of the block on
which we currently apply the changes along the embedding path (see below).
Embedding the vertices. Let (h1, ..., hM3) be a Hamiltonian path of the 3c-dimensional hyper-
cube. Let (h′1, ..., h′M ) be a Hamiltonian path of the c-dimensional hypercube and (h′′1 , ..., h′′4 )
be a Hamiltonian path of the 2-dimensional hypercube. To define φ(v), we embed a vertex
v = (k1, k2, k3, k4, i) into the vertex of the hypercube whose first block is the bits of hk1 , the
second block is h′k2 , then h
′
k3
, h′k4 and h
′′
k5
. We set the parity bit to be the parity of v, the edge
block to 0, and the counter block to 0.
Embedding the edges. Note that the coloring of G in 108 colors naturally induces an order on
the edges. Every vertex has at most one m’th edge, and two adjacent vertices agree on the index
of this edge. The m’th edge of v, from v in layer k1 to u in layer k1 + 1, is defined by the following
sequence of bit flipping.
1. The m’th bit in the edge block is flipped to 1.
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2. A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 1.
3. A single bit in the first index block is flipped to encode the integer k1 + 1.
4. A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 2.
5. If the displacement of the edge is (±1,0,0), a single bit in the second index block is flipped
to encode the integer k2 ± 1. If the displacement of the edge is (0,±1,0), a single bit in the
third index block is flipped to encode the integer k3 ± 1. If the displacement of the edge is
(0,0,±1), a single bit in the fourth index block is flipped to encode the integer k3 ± 1.
6. A single bit in the counter block is flipped to encode the integer 3.
7. The two bits of the fifth index block are flipped (one by one in a fixed order) to encode the
integer j (the replication index of u).
8. The counter block returns back to 0.
9. The m’th bit in the edge block is flipped back to 0.
It is easy to see that this path ends up at φ(u) (note that the parity of v and u is the same, and
indeed we did not flip the parity bit). We argue that the defined paths are disjoint. It is sufficient to
prove that given a node on the path one can recover the previous node. Given the color of the edge
and the counter, it is immediate to recover the previous node in all intermediate steps excluding
steps (3) and (5). In steps (3) and (5) it is unclear whether we should flip the corresponding index
block or the counter block. To determine this we use the parity bit: In step (3), if the parity bit is
equal to the parity of the encoded vertices, then it means that we did not flip yet a bit, and to get
the previous vertex we set the counter block to encode 0. If the parity bit differs from the parity
of the encoded indices, then it means that we have flip a bit, and to get the previous vertex we
should flip a bit in the index block. In step (5) we do the opposite. If the parity bit differs from
the parity of the encoded indices, then we flip the counter. If the parity bit is equal to the parity
of the encoded indices, then we flip the index block.
It is easy to check that the embedding is vertex isolated because of the parity bit.
3.3.3 Embedding into the Grid
Lemma 3.6. The graph G (with 3M6 vertices) can be VIED-embedded in a constant-dimension grid
with O(M6) vertices. As a corollary, CC(VetoLS(Gridd)) = Ω(
√
N) for some constant-dimension
grid with N vertices.
Proof. (sketch) The embedding is very similar to the one we presented in Lemma 3.5 for embedding
into the hypercube. In the proof of Lemma 3.5 we only used the fact that the hypercube has an
Hamiltonian cycle. For the grid, we will take advantage of the observation that the two-dimensional
grid has an Hamiltonian cycle.
Specifically, a vertex v = (k1, k2, k3, k4, i) is embedded into the vertex of the grid whose first
block is the bits of that correspond to a Hamiltonian cycle on GridM1.5×M1.5 , blocks 2 − 4 are
specified using the Hamiltonian cycle on GridM0.5×M0.5 , and block 5 using the Hamiltonian cycle on
Grid2 ×Grid2. We set the parity bit to be the parity of v, the edge block to 0, and the counter block
to 0. Applying very similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 3.5 we establish the embedding of
G into the grid [M1.5]2 × [M0.5]6 × [2]111.
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3.3.4 Embedding into the Odd Graph
Lemma 3.7. There exists a VIED embedding of Hypn in Oddn+2. As a corollary, CC(VetoLS(Oddn)) =
Ω(2n/2).
Proof. We first embed Hypn in Hypn+1 simply by φ1(v) = (v,0) and χ1({v,w}) = {(v,0), (w,0)}.
Obviously this embedding is edge disjoint (but not vertex isolated).
We now embed Hypn+1 in Oddn+2. We refer to each vertex of Hypn+1 as a subset S ⊂ [n + 1].
We denote S + n + 1 = {i + n + 1 ∶ i ∈ S}. We denote T c = [n + 1] ∖ T (this notation will be relevant
for subsets of [n + 1] rather than subsets of [2n + 3] as the vertices of Oddn+2). The embedding is
defined by
φ2(S) =S ∪ (Sc + n + 1).
χ2(S,S ∪ {i}) =S ∪ (Sc + n + 1)→ (Sc ∖ {i}) ∪ (S + n + 1) ∪ {2n + 3}→
S ∪ {i} ∪ ((S ∪ {i})c + n + 1)
It is easy to check that this indeed defines a valid path on Oddn+2. All the defined paths are disjoint
because given a vertex on a path T ∪ (T ′ + n) ∪ {2n + 3} we can identify the edge: S = T ′ and i is
the unique element that is missing from both sets T and T ′.
Now we define the embedding of Hypn in Oddn+2 to be the decomposition of these two em-
beddings; I.e., φ(v) = φ2(φ1(v)) and χ(e) = χ2(χ1(e)). The embedding (φ,χ) is edge disjoint
because both embeddings (φ1, χ1) and (φ2, χ2) are edge disjoint. Now we prove that (φ,χ) is
vertex isolated. A vertex φ2(φ1(v)) = S ∪ (Sc + 2n) has n + 2 neighbours in Oddn+2. Among these
neighbours, n + 1 participate in an embedding of the outgoing edges of S ∈ Hypn+1. So there is a
single neighbour, Sc ∪ (S + n + 1), who is suspected to belong to an embedding of an independent
edge. Note that Sc∪(S+n+1) = φ2(Sc) and Sc ∈ Hypn+1 does not belong to the embedding of Hypn
in Hypn+1: indeed, for every vertex v ∈ Hypn the complementary vertex (v,0) = (v,1) ∈ Hypn+1 does
not belong to the embedding of Hypn in Hypn+1 (neither to φ1(VHypn) nor to χ1(EHypn)).
3.4 Step 3: From VetoLS to SumLS
First, recall that the potential function gets values in [W ]. We reduce the problem VetoLS(G) to
SumLS(G). Alice’s potential remains unchanged (i.e., fA(v) ∶= fG(v)). Bob fixes some valid vertex
v∗ ∈ S and sets his potential as follows: fB(v) ∶= 0 if v ∈ S, otherwise he sets fB(v) = −d(v, v∗) ⋅
(W + 1), where d is the distance in G. Indeed every valid local maximum v is a local maximum
of the sum because all the valid neighbours have lower sum of potentials fA(v) + fB(v) = fG(v) ≥
fG(w) = fA(v)+ fB(v) and all invalid neighbours have negative sum of potentials fA(w)+ fB(w) ≤
W − (W + 1) < 0. It is easy to check that every valid vertex that is not a local maximum is not
a local maximum of the sum. Finally, every invalid vertex v is not a local maximum of the sum
because the neighbour w in the direction of the shortest path to v∗ has higher sum of potentials:
fA(v) + fB(v) ≤W − d(v, v∗)(W + 1) < −(d(v, v∗) − 1)(W + 1)
= −(d(w,v∗) − 1)(W + 1) ≤ fA(w) + fB(w).
We apply this reduction on the graphs considered in Lemmas 3.6, 3.5 and 3.7 to deduce the theorem.
4 Proof of Theorem 2.2
The overall structure of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.1.
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Step 0 We start with a local-search-related communicationally-hard problem over some graph
H.
Step 1 We use the intermediate problem VetoLS(G), where G is constructed from H.
Step 2 We embed G in the three-dimensional grid.
Step 3 We reduce VetoLS(Grid) to SumLS(Grid).
However, in order to be able to embed G in the three-dimensional grid, the degree of G should
be very low; at most 6. The pebbling game result of [Go¨o¨s and Pitassi, 2014] does not serve our
purposes because the degree of the graph G is 36. Hence, our starting point is some different
local-search-related communicationally hard problem over some degree 3 graph H. In Step 1, we
carefully modify H to G by increasing the degree only by 1; i.e., G is degree 4 graph. Now, in Step
2 we are able to embed G in the three-dimensional grid. Step 3 is identical to that in the proof of
Theorem 2.1.
4.1 Step 0: The Query Complexity of Local Search and its Simulated Variant
In the problem QuLS(H) there is a graph H and a function h that gives a value h(v) for every
vertex. The function h can only be accessed via queries h(v). Furthermore, for each two vertices
v,u are distinct: h(v) ≠ h(u). The goal is to find a local maximum of h while minimizing the
number of queries.
Santha and Szegedy [Santha and Szegedy, 2004] introduced a general connection between the
query complexity of the local search problem and the expansion of a graph. Since random 3-
regular graphs are expanders with high probability, we have that there exists a degree 3 graph
H with N vertices for which finding a local maximum requires poly(N) queries. However, their
construction does not assume that h(v) ≠ h(u) for every two vertices v and u. This is easy to fix:
let h′(v) = 2N ⋅ h(v) + v (where v ∈ [N] denotes the index of v). Observe that each local maximum
of h′ is also a local maximum of h and that the query h′(v) can be computed by one query h(v),
so the number of queries required to find a local maximum of h′ is at least the number of queries
required to find a local maximum of h. We therefore have:
Lemma 4.1 (essentially [Santha and Szegedy, 2004]). There exists a degree 3 graph H with N
vertices and a function h′ such that every vertex has a distinct value for which finding a local
maximum requires poly(N) queries.
The simulation theorems provides us a recipe to produce problems with high communica-
tion complexity, given a problem with high query complexity. In particular, [Go¨o¨s et al., 2017,
Anshu et al., 2017] suggest the index-gadget recipe, which starting from QuLS(H) is translated
to the following communication problem SimLS(H): for each vertex v ∈ H, Alice holds an array
of valuations (f(v, i))i∈[M] where f(v, I(v)) = h(v) and2 M = poly(N). Bob holds the correct
index I(v) ∈ [M]. Their goal is to compute a local maximum of the function f(v, I(v)). Direct
application of the simulation theorems to our setting gives that:
CC(SimLS(H)) = Θ(logN)QC(QuLS(H)) = poly(N)
2E.g., M = N256 in [Go¨o¨s et al., 2017].
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4.2 Step 1: The Communication Complexity of VetoLS
In this step we prove the communication hardness of VetoLS on a certain bounded degree graph.
We recall the definition of VetoLS(G). Alice’s input is a function fG ∶ V → [W ]. Bob’s input is
a non-empty subset S ⊂ V . The output is a vertex v ∈ S such that fG(v) ≥ fG(w) for every w ∈ S
such that {v,w} ∈ E (i.e., for every valid neighbour).
Unlike the communication pebbling game problem that uses index gadgets of size 3, the simu-
lated QuLS problem uses gadgets of size M = polyN (N is the number of vertices of G). The idea
in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is to replicate each vertex according to the gadget size, and connect
every vertex with all its replicated neighbours. This idea is impractical here, because the degree of
the resulting graph will be huge. Instead, we replace each replicated vertex with degree 3M by a
carefully chosen binary tree structure in order to reduce the degree.
Figure 1: The graph G. The replacement of a vertex byM pairs of binary trees, and the neighbours
of the leaves of T out.
v
w1 w2 w3 T out(v,1)
T in(v,1)
T out(v,2)
T in(v,2)
T out(v,M)
T in(v,M)
3a
3a
M3
t(i,j,k)(v,1)
T in(w1, i) T in(w2, j) T in(w3, k)
The Graph G. Without loss of generality we assume that M = 2a is a power of 2. We obtain our
graph G by replacing every vertex v ∈H by a tuple of M graphs (T out(v, i) ∪ T in(v, i))i∈M , where
T out(v, i)∪T in(v, i) denotes two binary trees with an overlapping root, both of depth log(M3) = 3a
(see Figure 1). Roughly speaking, the role of T out(v, i) is to decode the correct indices of the three
neighbours, and in parallel to split the outgoing edges from vi. The role of T
in(v, i) is simply to
gather the incoming edges into vi.
More formally, the vertices of T out(v, i) at depth d are denoted by (ts(v, i))s∈{0,1}d . The vertices
of T in(v, i) at depth d are denoted by (t′s(v, i))s∈{0,1}d . The vertices at depth 3a will be called
leaves3. As was mentioned above, the vertex at depth 0 of these two trees coincides (i.e., t∅(v, i) =
t′∅(v, i)). Now we describe how the leaves of T out(v, i) connect to the leaves of T in(w, j) for w ≠ v.
For a leaf ts(v, i) ∈ T out(v, i) we denote s = (j1, j2, j3) where j1, j2, j3 ∈ [M] are the indices of the
three neighbors of v, w1,w2,w3. The leaf ts(v, i) ∈ G has a single edge to the tree T in(w1, j1),
a single edge to the tree T in(w2, j2), and a single edge to the tree T in(w3, j3) (see Figure 1). In
principle, we should specify which leaf exactly in T in(w1, j1) is connected to ts(v, i). However, since
it will not play any role in our arguments, we just implement a counting argument to ensure that
3Note that they are leaves only with respect to the tree. In the graph G they will not be leaves.
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the number of neighbours from other trees of every leaf t′s′(w, j) is at most 3. If w has a neighbour
v, then for every i ∈ [M] exactly M2 vertices ts(v, i) will encode the index j. So from T out(v, i) we
have M ⋅M2 =M3 incoming edges. Summing over the 3 neighbours we get 3M3 incoming edges.
If we distribute them equally among the M3 vertices, we get 3 neighbours for each.
Alice’s Potential. Alice’s potential function is defined by fG(t′s(v, i)) = 7af(v, i) + 3a − ∣s∣ and
fG(ts(v, i)) = 7af(v, i) + 3a + ∣s∣. Namely the potential in the tree T ′s(v, i) starts at a value of
7af(v, i) in the leaves of T in(v, i). It increases by 1 after every edge until it gets to the root. At
the root we move to the tree T out(v, i) where it proceeds to increase by 1 until it gets to the leaves
of T out(v, i) where the value of the potential is 7af(v, i) + 6a.
Bob’s valid Vertices. Now we define the subset of valid vertices S held by Bob. Let
bin(i) ∈ {0,1}a denote the binary representation of an index i ∈ [M]. We denote by nbin(v) =
(bin(I(wi)))i=1,2,3 the binary representation of the triple of v’s neighbours. For a binary string b
we denote by b[k] its first k elements. A vertex ts(v, i) ∈ S iff i = I(v) and s = nbin(v)[∣s∣] (recall
that I(v) is Bob’s input in SimLS). Informally speaking the valid vertices are those where the
tree T out(v, i) (or T in(v, i)) has the correct index, and if the vertex is in T out(v, i) we require, in
addition, that the prefix of the encoding of the neighbours’ indices will be correct.
Local Maxima in G. Since the potential of Alice increases starting from the leaves of T in(v, i)
and ending at the leaves of T out(v, i), and in addition for every valid vertex there exists a valid
neighbour with higher (lower) depth in T out(v, i) (in T in(v, i)) the valid local maxima appear only
on the leaves of T out(v, i). Every valid leaf of T out(v, i) has a potential of 7af(v, I(v)) + 6a (i.e.,
the correct potential) and is connected to leaves of T in(wj , I(wj)) for j = 1,2,3 with a potential
of 7af(wj , I(wj)) (i.e., the correct potential of the neighbours). Note that the potential values are
integers. Therefore, 7af(v, I(v))+6a ≥ 7af(w, I(w)) if and only if f(v, I(v)) ≥ f(w, I(w)). Hence,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between valid local maxima of fG with respects to the set if
valid vertices S and local maxima of h over H.
This completes the proof item 1 of the Theorem.
4.3 Step 2: Embedding the Degree 4 Graph Into the Grid
We VIED embed (see Definition 3.3) the degree 4 graph G obtained in the previous step into the
grid. We use Lemma 3.4 to deduce hardness of VetoLS over the grid.
Lemma 4.2. Every degree 4 graph G with N vertices can be VIED-embedded in Grid4N×(2N+2)×2.
As a corollary, CC(VetoLS(GridN×N×2)) = poly(N).
Proof. We embed the graph G in the grid whose vertices are {3,4, ...,4N + 2} × {−1,0, ...,2N} ×
{0,1}. We denote the vertices of G by {vi}i∈[N] and we embed φ(vi) = (4i,0,0). We use (for
instance) the structure of Figure 2 to place the four outgoing edges of (4i,0,0) at the points
(4i − 1,1,0), (4i,1, 0), (4i + 1,1,0) and (4i + 2,1,0).
We denote by {ei}i∈[m] the edges in the graph G. Note that m ≤ 4N/2 = 2N because the
graph degree is 4. The embedding of the edges is by an increasing order e1, ..., em . For an edge
ei = (vj , vk) let rj ∈ {−1,0,1,2} be the minimal index such that the vertex (4j + rj ,1,0) is not yet
used by previous edges {ei′}i′<i. Similarly we define rk. The edge ei = (vj , vk) is embedded to the
path:
(4j + rj ,1,0)↭ (4j + rj , i,0)↔ (4j + rj , i,1)↭ (4k + rk, i,1)↔ (4k + rk, i,0)↭ (4k + rk,1,0)
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Figure 2: The outgoing edges of the embedded vertices.
3 4 8 4N
-1
0
1
where (x, y, z) ↭ (x, y′, z) denotes a straight line that consistently changes the second coordinate
(similarly for (x, y, z)↭ (x′, y, z)).
The embedding is VIED because all horizontal lines appear at (⋅, ⋅,1) while all vertical lines
appear at (⋅, ⋅,0). The embedding is vertex isolated by the construction of Figure 2.
Finally Step 3 is identical to Section 3.4. We use the reduction from VetoLS to SumLS to
deduce the Theorem.
5 The Communication Complexity of Exact Potential Games
Recall that a game is an exact potential game if there exists a potential function φ ∶ An → R,
such that φ(ai, a−i) − φ(a′i, a−i) = ui(ai, a−i) − ui(a′i, a−i) for every player i, every pair of actions
ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai, and every profile of the opponents a−i ∈ A−i. In this section we study the communica-
tion complexity of exact potential games. We assume that each of the players knows only his own
utility function and the goal is to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in the game. In game the-
oretic settings this form of information distribution is called uncoupledness [Hart and Mas-Colell,
2003, Hart and Mansour, 2010]. It is known that the communication complexity of computing an
equilibrium captures (up to a logarithmic factor) the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics
to equilibrium [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004, Hart and Mansour, 2010].
As a preliminary result, we demonstrate that determining whether a game is an exact potential
games (under the uncoupled distribution of information) requires low communication. This result
is in contrast to ordinal potential games (see Appendix A).
Proposition 5.1. Consider a game with n players and N actions. There exists a randomized
communication protocol that determines whether the game is an exact potential game or not that
uses only poly(log(N), n) bits of communication.
The proof is quite simple, and we demonstrate it here for 2-player games. Monderer and Shapley
[Monderer and Shapley, 1996] show that a two-player game (A,B,uA, uB) is an exact potential
game if and only if for every four actions a, a′ ∈ A, and b, b′ ∈ B we have
(uA(a′, b) − uA(a, b)) + (uB(a′, b′) − uB(a′, b))
+ (uA(a, b′) − uA(a′, b′)) + (uB(a, b) − uB(a, b′)) = 0
(2)
Namely, the sum of gains/losses from unilateral divinations over every cycle of size four should
sum up to zero. Now each player checks, for every possible four-action cycle, whether the sum of
changes in his utility equals the negative of the change in utility of the other player for the same
cycle. Verifying this simultaneously for all cycles can be done by applying any efficient protocol
for the equality problem (we recall that we focus on randomized communication protocols). For a
general number of players, a similar characterization exists and we have to use protocols based on
the “equal sum” problem as demonstrated below.
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Proof of Proposition 5.1. By [Monderer and Shapley, 1996], an n-player game (A,u) is an exact
potential game if and only if for every pair of permutations pi,pi over [n] and for every pair of action
profiles a, b ∈ A we have
n
∑
k=1
upi(k)(b, a, pi([k])) − upi(k)(b, a, pi([k − 1]))+
n
∑
k=1
upi(k)(a, b, pi([k])) − upi(k)(a, b, pi([k − 1])) = 0
(3)
Simply speaking, for every sequence of unilateral deviations that starts at a goes back and forth to
b, where each player changes his strategy from ai to bi once and from bi to ai once, the sum in the
gains/losses of all players from the unilateral divinations should sum up to 0.
The players should check whether Equation (3) holds for all possible pairs of profiles a, b ∈ [N]n
and pairs of permutations pi,pi over [n]. The number of these equations is c = m2n(n!)2. Each
player can generate from his private input a vector in {−2W, ...,0, ...,2W}c which captures the sum
of changes in his utility for each one of the tuples (a, b, pi, pi). So the problem can be reduced to
the following: Each player i holds a vector vi ∈ {−2W, ...,0, ...,2W}c and the goal of the players is
to determine whether ∑i∈[n] vi = 0c. This variant of the equality problem has a poly(logW, log c) =
poly(n, logN) randomized communication protocol [Nisan, 1993, Viola, 2015].
In contrast, identifying whether a game is an ordinal potential game is hard, even for random-
ized communication protocols. Identification of the ordinal potential property has a reduction to
the disjointness problem. We relegate these reductions (for two-player and for n-player games)
to Appendix A. The contrast between the hardness of identifying whether a game is an ordinal
potential game and the easiness of identifying whether a game is an exact potential game might
give some hope that computing an equilibrium in exact potential games is much easier than in
ordinal potential games. Unfortunately, our main results for this section show that finding a Nash
equilibrium remains hard even for exact potential games.
Theorem 5.2. Consider the two-party promise communication problem where Alice holds the utility
uA ∶ [N] × [N]→ R, and Bob holds the utility uB of an exact potential game. The goal is to output
a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. The problem requires poly(N) bits of communication, even
for randomized protocols.
We can also show hardness for the 2n-player 2-action case.
Theorem 5.3. Consider the two-party promise communication problem where Alice holds the util-
ities of (ui)i∈[n] and Bob holds the utilities (ui)i∈[2n]∖[n] of an exact potential game, and they should
output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. The problem requires 2Ω(n) communication, even for
randomized protocols.
This problem is obviously requires at least as much communication as the 2n-party communi-
cation problem where each player holds his own utility function.
In both theorems, we reduce from the problem of finding a local maximum (on a bounded degree
graph in the two player case and on the hypercube in the n player case) and show that the set of
pure Nash equilibria corresponds exactly to the set of local maxima. The proofs of the Theorems
appear in Sections 6 and 7.
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5.1 Total variants of Pure Nash Equilibrium Search
In Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 we have demonstrated communicational hardness of two promise problems.
Such hardness results are not rare in the literature. For instance, finding a pure Nash equilibrium
in a game when it is promised that such an equilibrium exists.
To appreciate the novelty of our results we focus on a total variant of equilibrium search problem
TotExPot: either find a Nash equilibrium or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not
an exact potential game. By [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] such a succinct evidence, in the form
of a violating cycle (see Equations (2),(3)), necessarily exists. More formally, in the problem
TotExPot(2,N) Alice holds the utility uA, Bob holds a utility uB of an N ×N game, and the
output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a cycle of actions of size 4 that violates Equation (2).
Similarly in the problem TotExPot(2n,2) Alice holds the utilities (ui)i∈n, Bob holds the utilities
(ui)i∈[2n]∖[n] of an 2n-player 2-action game, and the output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a
cycle of actions of size 4n that violates Equation (3).
In Proposition 5.1 we showed that low communication is needed to determine whether a game
is an exact potential game or not (accompanied with an evidence in case it is not). From these
observation along with Theorem 5.2 we deduce that
Corollary 5.4. The total search problem TotExPot(2,N) requires poly(N) communication.
Similarly for the 2n-player 2-action case we have
Corollary 5.5. The total search problem TotExPot(2n,2) requires 2Ω(n) communication.
Note that the non-deterministic complexity of TotExPot(2,N) is log(N). Indeed a Nash
equilibrium can be described by single action profile (Θ(logN) bits), and a violating cycle can
be described by 4 action profiles. Each player can verify his best-reply condition and commu-
nicate a single bit to the opponent. Also verification of violating cycle can be done by commu-
nicating 4 valuations of utility. Similarly, we can show that the non-deterministic complexity of
TotExPot(2n,n) is poly(n). Thus again, our results demonstrate an exponential separation
between the non-deterministic and the randomized communication complexity of a total search
problem.
6 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We reduce the problem of finding a local maximum on a graph G with degree 4 to finding a Nash
equilibrium in an exact potential game with two players and N actions. We then apply Theorem
2.2(1) to get our communication bound.
We construct the following exact potential game. For a vertex v ∈ V we denote by ni(v) the
i’th neighbour of v for i = 1,2,3,4. The strategy set of both players is A = B = V × [W ]5 (recall
that the potentials in SumLS(G) get values in [W ] and that W = poly(N)). The interpretation of
a strategy (v,x) ∈ A where Ð→x = (x0, x1, ..., x4) ∈ [W ]5 is (Alice’s reported) potential for v and its
four neighbours. This report induces a valuation for all vertices w ∈ V by
val(v,
Ð→x )(w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x0 if w = v;
xi if w = ni(v);
0 otherwise.
A strategy (v,Ð→x ) is truthful if and only if x0 = fA(v) and xi = fA(ni(v)) for all neighbours of v (in
short, Ð→x = n(v)). Similarly Bob’s strategy (w,Ð→y ) induces a valuation val(w,Ð→y )(v) on all vertices
v ∈ V , and a truthful report is similarly defined.
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The utilities of Alice and Bob are given by (recall that d(v,w) is the distance in the graph
between two vertices v and w):
uA((v,Ð→x ), (w,Ð→y )) = 4W ⋅ 1d(v,w)≤1 + 4W ⋅ 1x=n(v) + val(w,
Ð→y )(v) + val(v,Ð→x )(w) + fA(v)
uB((v,Ð→x ), (w,Ð→y )) = 4W ⋅ 1d(v,w)≤1 + 4W ⋅ 1y=n(w) + val(w,
Ð→y )(v) + val(v,Ð→x )(w) + fB(w)
Namely, both players get large reward of 4W if they choose adjacent vertices, or the same vertex.
Both players get large reward of 4W if they report truthfully their own valuations in the neigh-
bourhood of their vertex. Both players get the sum of valuations of the two chosen vertices v,w
according to the report of the opponent. In addition Alice gets the (partial) potential of her vertex
according to fA, and Bob gets the potential of his vertex according to fB.
Lemma 6.1. The game is an exact potential game.
Proof. We will see that the game can be “decomposed” to two exact potential games, and will use
this “decomposition” to provide a potential function for our game. We will use the following basic
properties of potential games. We recall the notation of (A1,A2, u1, u2) = (A,u) for a two-player
game, where each Ai is the action space of player i and ui is the utility function of player i.
• An identical interest game (A,u) is a game in which u1 = u2. An identical interest game is
an exact potential game with potential function ϕ = u1.
• An opponent independent game is a game in which the utility of each player i depends only on
his own actions: ui(a1, a2) = ui(ai) for every (a1, a2) ∈ A. Every opponent independent game
is an exact potential game where the potential function is simply the sum of the utilities of
the players.
• For every pair of exact potential games (A,u′), (A,u′′) with potentials ϕ′, ϕ′′, the game
(A,u′ + u′′) is an exact potential game with potential ϕ = ϕ′ +ϕ′′.
Note that our game can be written as a sum of an identical interest game:
u′A = u
′
B = 4W ⋅ 1d(v,w)≤1 + val
(w,Ð→y )(v) + val(v,Ð→x )(w)
and an opponent independent game:
u′′A = 4W ⋅ 1Ð→x =n(v) + fA(v), u′′B = 4W ⋅ 1Ð→y =n(w) + fB(w)
Therefore their sum is a potential game with potential:
φ((v,Ð→x ), (y,Ð→w )) =4W ⋅ 1d(v,w)≤1 + 4W ⋅ 1Ð→x =n(v) + 4W ⋅ 1Ð→y =n(w)
+ val(w,
Ð→y )(v) + val(v,Ð→x )(w) + fA(v) + fB(w)
(4)
Lemma 6.2. The pure Nash equilibria of the game are precisely ((v,Ð→x ), (v,Ð→x ′)) such that v is
a local maximum of fA + fB and
Ð→x and Ð→x ′ are truth reports of the values of v and its neighbours
according to fA and fB, respectively.
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Proof. Pure Nash equilibria are the local maxima (with respect to a unilateral deviation) of the
potential. It is easy to check that in a local maximum x and y are truth reports, because the gain
in a truthful report is 4W whereas if the players do not report truthfully they lose this reward.
However, Alice can gain at most val(v,
Ð→x )(w)+ fA(v) ≤ 2W from misreporting the value, and Bob’s
loss is similar. Similarly, in a local maximum v and w are neighbours (or the same vertex), because
the gain of 4W is lost if v and w are not neighbors, in which case Alice’s gain from the terms
val(w,
Ð→y )(v) + val(v,Ð→x )(w) + fA(v) is at most 3W . A similar argument holds for Bob. For a profile
of strategies that satisfies the above the potential is equal to (see Equation (4)):
φ((v,Ð→x ), (w,Ð→y )) = 12W + fB(v) + fA(w) + fA(v) + fA(w) (5)
A profile where v ≠ w is not a Nash equilibrium because by the distinctness assumption, fA(v) +
fB(v) ≠ fA(w) + fB(w), so if fA(v) + fB(v) < fA(w) + fB(w) Alice can deviate to (w,Ð→y ) and
increase the potential; Otherwise Bob can deviate to (v,Ð→x ) and increase the potential. Finally, a
profile ((v,Ð→x ), (v,Ð→x ′)) with truth reporting is clearly a Nash equilibrium if it is a local maximum
of fA + fB. If v is not a local maximum of fA + fB, then Alice will increase the potential (given
in Equation (5)) if she deviates to the action (w,n(w)) where w is a neighbour of v with fA(w) +
fB(w) > fA(v) + fB(v).
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 complete the proof of the theorem.
7 Proof of Theorem 5.3
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is done in two steps. First, we show a 2Ω(
3
√
n) bound. This is the
significant part, in terms of the deduced result and also in terms of the techniques. Thereafter, in
Section 7.1 we improve the bound to 2Ω(n) building upon the arguments of this Section.
We start with proving the 2Ω(
3
√
n) bound. Our starting point is the proof of the hardness
of 2-player n-actions exact potential games (Theorem 5.2). However, since we consider n-player
binary-action games, it is convenient to reduce the problem SumLS(Hypn) (local search on the
n-th hypercube). We will get an exact potential game with Θ(n3) players, where each player has
only two actions.
A naive approach and an obstacle. The simplest idea that comes to mind is to consider a
group of n-players who will choose v ∈ Hypn, and a group of (n + 1)⌈logW ⌉ players who will report
the valuation vector Ð→x of the vertex itself and its n neighbours, and similarly for Bob. We would
like to set the group of Alice’s players an identical utility that is similar to the utility of Alice in
the two-player game. An obstacle that arises with this approach is that if the groups of Alice’s and
Bob’s players are playing two adjacent vertices v,w ∈ Hypn with truthful valuations, none of them
will want to switch to the opponent’s vertex, even if at the adjacent vertex the sum of fA + fB is
higher. This follows from the fact if (v,Ð→x ) is a truthful valuation, then (w,Ð→x ) is not necessarily a
truthful valuation (because the relevant vertices and their order is different with respect to v and
with respect to w). Thus, players in Alice’s group will gain the difference in the potentials (at most
3W ) but lose 4W because now the group report is not truthful. Note that the same obstacle does
not arise in the two-player case. In the two-player case Alice could change the vertex v and the
report Ð→x simultaneously. In the n-player case we consider unilateral deviations that correspond to
changes of single bits and thus such simultaneous deviations are impossible.
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The solution to the obstacle. To resolve the above problematic issue, we modify the form of
the report Ð→x in the game.
• Instead of reporting the values in the ball of radius 1 around v (i.e., the neighbors of v), each
player reports the values in the ball of radius 2 around v. In the hypercube, this means that
the report consists of m = 1 + n + n(n−1)
2
valuations.
• Instead of reporting the values in a fixed order (namely (v,n1(v), ..., n4(v))), the players
jointly report pairs, where each pair consists of an index of a vertex v and fA(v) (or fB(v)).
The construction. More formally, for Alice, we have a group of n players with binary actions
who jointly choose the vertex v ∈ {0,1}n. In other words, the action of the i’th player in the
group corresponds to the i’th bit in the index of the vertex. We have a group of mn players with
binary actions who jointly choose a list of m vertices Ð→xv = (xv1, ..., xvm) ∈ ({0,1}n)m. Finally,
we have a group of mb ∶= m⌈logW ⌉ players with binary actions who jointly choose a list of m
valuations
Ð→
xf = (xf1, ..., xfm) ∈ ({0,1}b)m. We denote Ð→x = (Ð→xv,Ð→xf). Similarly to the two-player
case, a report Ð→x = (Ð→xv,Ð→xf) defines a valuation function over all vertices. For a list Ð→xv we denote
Imin(Ð→xv) ∶= {i ∈ [m] ∶ xvi ≠ xvj for all j < i} the set of indices with first appearance of a vertex.
The valuation is defined by
val
Ð→x (w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
val(xfi) if w = xvi for i ∈ Imin(Ð→xv);
0 otherwise.
where val(⋅) ∈ [W ] denotes the numerical value of the binary string. Note that in case of multiple
appearances of w in the list we choose the value at the first appearance. Similarly for Bob, we have
three groups who jointly choose w, Ð→yw, and Ð→yf . The report Ð→y defines a valuation function valÐ→y
over all vertices. Note that the total number of players in the game is 2(n +m(n + b)) = O(n3).
Before we present the actual utilities we informally describe the prioritization according to
which we set the utilities. In the two-player case there were only two levels of prioritization: the
top level priority included the distance d(v,w) (the 1d(v,w)≤1 term in the utility functions) and the
truthfulness of the report (the 1x=n(v) term in the utility functions). The bottom level priority
included the remaining potential related terms (val(w,
Ð→y )(v), val(v,Ð→x )(w), fA(v)). More formally
by prioritization we mean that improving the higher priority term by 1 should increase the utility
irrespective of how the lower priority terms change. Indeed the multiplier 4W was set in such a
way. In the current construction, the prioritization levels are more involved, and we sketch them
here from the highest priority to the lowest.
1. The distance d(v,w).
2. The list Ð→xv should contain v and its neighbours.
3. The valuations
Ð→
xf should be correct for v and its neighbours.
4. The potential related terms (the core of the proof).
5. The list Ð→xv should contain the vertices within a distance 2 from v.
6. The valuations
Ð→
xf should be correct for vertices within a distance 2 from v.
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Now we describe what is the analogue of each one of these priorities in the n-player case.
Hereafter, d(⋅, ⋅) will denote the hamming distance (in the corresponding dimension). We denote
by Br(v) the ball of radius r around v with respect to the hamming distance.
1. 1d(v,w)≤1 is translated to −d(v,w) ⋅ 1d(v,w)≥2. Namely the loss is 0 in case the players choose
the same vertex or adjacent vertices. Otherwise the loss increases with the distance.
2. Given v, we denote by N1(v) ∶= {(v1, ..., vm) ∶ {v1, ..., vm} ⊃ B1(v)} ⊂ {0,1}mn. Namely, N1(v)
specifies v and its neighbours. At the second priority we have −d(Ð→xv,N1(v)).
3. Given v and Ð→xv, for an index i ∈ Imin(Ð→xv) such that xvi ∈ B1(v) we have at the third
priority the term −d(xf, bin(fA(xvi)) when we recall that bin(z) ∈ {0,1}b represents the
binary representation of the potential value z ∈ [W ]. Note that this definition takes into
account only the first appearance of every neighbour, which is consistent with the definition
of val
Ð→x . For other indices i ∈ [m] the term will be identical but it will appear at the lowest
sixth priority.
4. The profile (v,Ð→x ), (w,Ð→y ) defines a natural analogue of the two-player potential terms:
val
Ð→y (v), valÐ→y (w), fA(v), fB(w). These terms are at the forth priority.
5. Given v, we denote by N2(v) ∶= {(v1, ..., vm) ∶ {v1, ..., vm} = B2(v)} ⊂ {0,1}mn the lists that
include precisely the set of all vertices within a radius 2 from v. At the fifth priority we have
−d(Ð→xv,N2(v)).
6. Finally, similarly to item 3, given v and Ð→xv, for every index i ∈ [m] we have at the sixth
priority the term −d(xf, bin(fA(xvi)).
Now we are ready to define the utilities. As was mentioned above all the players in Alice’s
groups have identical utilities which is equal to:
uAi (v,Ð→x ,w,Ð→y ) = − k1 ⋅ d(v,w)1d(v,w)≥2
− k2 ⋅ d(Ð→xv,N1(v))
− k3 ⋅ ∑
i∈Imin(Ð→xv) s.t. xvi∈B1(v)
d(xf, bin(fA(xvi))
+ k4[val
Ð→y (v) + valÐ→x (w) + fA(v)]
− k5 ⋅ d(Ð→xv,N2(v))
− k6 ⋅ ∑
i∈[m]
d(xf, bin(fA(xvi)),
when we set k1, ..., k6 as follows. We set k6 = 1. Now we set k5 to be greater than the maximal
difference of sixth priority terms, e.g., k5 = 2n
2b > mb. Now we set k4 to be the greater than the
maximal total difference of sixth and fifth priority terms, e.g., k4 = 2n
3b >mb + k5(nm). Similarly
we may proceed with k3 = 8Wn
3b, k2 = 8Wn
5b2, and k1 = 8Wn
8b2.
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Similarly we define each member in Bob’s group to have the following identical utility function:
uBi (v,Ð→x ,w,Ð→y ) = − k1 ⋅ d(v,w)1d(v,w)≥2
− k2 ⋅ d(Ð→yw,N1(w))
− k3 ⋅ ∑
i∈Imin(Ð→yw) s.t. ywi∈B1(w)
d(yf, bin(fA(ywi))
+ k4[val
Ð→y (v) + valÐ→x (w) + fB(w)]
− k5 ⋅ d(Ð→wy,N2(w))
− k6 ⋅ ∑
i∈[m]
d(yf, bin(fA(ywi)).
Lemma 7.1. The defined (2n + 2m(n + b))-player binary action game is an exact potential game.
Proof. If we view the game as a two-player game where Alice chooses (s, xˆ) and Bob chooses (r, yˆ)
the game is an exact potential game by similar arguments to those in Lemma 6.1. Namely it is
the sum of two games where one is identical interest game and the other is opponent independent
game. The potential function of the game is given by:
φ(v,Ð→x ,w,Ð→y ) = −k1 ⋅ d(v,w)1d(v,w)≥2
− k2[d(Ð→xv,N1(v)) + d(Ð→yw,N1(w))]
− k3[ ∑
i∈Imin(Ð→xv) s.t. xvi∈B1(v)
d(xf, bin(fA(xvi)) + ∑
i∈Imin(Ð→yw) s.t. ywi∈B1(w)
d(yf, bin(fA(ywi))]
+ k4[val
Ð→y (v) + valÐ→x (w) + fA(v) + fB(w)]
− k5[d(Ð→xv,N2(v)) + d(Ð→yw,N1(w))]
− k6[ ∑
i∈[m]
d(xf, bin(fA(xvi)) + ∑
i∈[m]
d(yf, bin(fB(ywi))]
Note that by replacing Alice (Bob) by a group of n +m(n + b) players all with the same utility we
only reduced the set of possible unilateral deviations. For each one of these unilateral deviation by
the two-player result the change is the utility is equal to the change in the potential.
Lemma 7.2. Every pure Nash equilibrium of the defined (2n + 2m(n + b))-player binary action
game is of the form (v,Ð→x , v,Ð→y ) where v is a local maximum of fA + fB over the hypercube.
Proof. The proof proceeds by narrowing the set of equilibria candidates according to the prioriti-
zation levels, with a twist at the fourth priority level.
First, in every equilibrium d(v,w) ≤ 1 because otherwise there exists a player in Alice’s v group
who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch increases the first term
in the utility of the group by k1. By the choice of k1, any change in the other terms of utilities is
smaller.
Second, in every equilibrium Ð→xv ∈ N1(v), because otherwise there exists a player in Alice’s Ð→xv
group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch does not effect
the first term of the utility, and it increases the second term by k2. By the choice of k2, any change
in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob we have Ð→yw ∈ N1(w).
Third, in every equilibrium for every i ∈ Imin(Ð→xv) such that xvi ∈ B1(v) we have xfi =
bin(fA(xvi)). Simply speaking, all first appearances of elements in B1(v) (which indeed appear
by the argument regarding the second priority level) have correct valuation. If it wasn’t so, then
there exists a player in Alice’s
Ð→
xfi group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by
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1. Such a switch does not affect the first two terms of the utility, and it increases the third term
by k3. By the choice of k3, any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob,
all first appearances of elements in B1(w) have correct valuation.
Now we jump to the fifth and the sixth priority levels. Given that v,w are neighbours (or the
same vertex) and their values already appear in the report Ð→x the terms of the utility in the fourth
priority level are not affected by the vertices xvi such that i ∉ Imin(Ð→xv) or xvi ∉ B1(v). Therefore,
we can deduce that necessarily in equilibrium we have Ð→xv ∈ N2(v) because otherwise some player
in the Ð→xv group can decrease the distance by 1 without affecting any of the first four terms, and
increase the fifth term by k5. Any change in the last terms is smaller. Similarly we can argue for
the sixth priority level, that the values of xfi for the corresponding indices do not affect any other
term. From these arguments it follows that in any equilibrium both Alice (and Bob) report a listÐ→xv (Ð→yw) that contains exactly all the vertices in the ball of radius 2 around v (w), moreover all
valuations of all these vertices are correct.
Now we go back to the fourth priority. Assume by way of contradiction that v ≠ w. Similarly to
the two-player case, the fourth term in the potential function of the game is val
Ð→x (w) + valÐ→y (v) +
fA(v) + fB(w), which under all the above restrictions of equilibria is equal to fA(w) + fB(v) +
fA(v) + fB(w).
Assume by way of contradiction that v ≠ w, then we may assume w.l.o.g. that fA(w)+fB(w) ≥
fA(v) + fB(v) + 1 (we recall that we may assume that the sum defers at adjacent vertices and
has integer values), then there exists a player in Alice’s v group who can switch his bit and turn
the vertex v into w. Let us examine the effect of this change on the potential. The first priority
level term remains 0. The key observation is that the second and third priority level terms also
remain 0. Note that the list Ð→xv includes all the vertices within radius 2 from v, and in particular all
the vertices within radius 1 from w. Similarly the valuations
Ð→
xf of these vertices remain correct.
Therefore the potential increases by at least k4 in the first four terms, and any change in the fifth
and sixth terms is smaller.
Finally for the case of v = w where v is not a local maximum we apply very similar arguments:
There exists a player in Alice’s group who can increase the potential of the game by k3 and change
only the fifth and sixth terms of the potential.
Lemmas 7.1, and 7.2 complete the proof of the 2Ω(
3
√
n) bound.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3: Improving the Bound to 2Ω(n)
The presented above reduction has Θ(n3) players, which yields a lower bound of 2Ω( 3
√
n) on the
problem of finding a pure Nash equilibrium. Here we modify the reduction to have Θ(n) players,
which implies a lower bound of 2Ω(n) on the problem of finding a pure Nash equilibrium. The idea
is to reduce the unnecessary “wasting” of players in the reduction. In the presented reduction Alice
reports to Bob the valuations of all vertices within radius 2 around v (there are Θ(n2) such vertices).
However, the arguments of the proof of Theorem 2.2 can be modified to show the existence of hard
instances over the hypercube where for most of the neighbours within radius 2 from v, Alice and
Bob know the valuations of each other over these vertices. In fact, for these hard instances there
exist only a constant number of neighbours for which Alice does not know Bob’s valuation, and
Bob does not know Alice’s. In the modified reduction, Alice’s group will report only the valuation
of the unknown vertices, which will require only O(n) players for her group.
We start with a modification of Lemma 3.5, which embeds the constant degree graph G in Hypn.
We present an embedding of G in Hypn with the additional property that every ball of radius 2 in
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Hypn contains at most constant number of vertices of the embedding’s image. Formally, given an
embedding (ϕ,χ) where ϕ ∶ VG → {0,1}n, χ ∶ EG → P (Hypn), we denote the image of the embedding
by Im(G) = {w ∈ {0,1}n ∶ w ∈ ϕ(VG) ∪ χ(EG)}.
Lemma 7.3. Let G be the graph with N vertices that is defined in Section 3.2 (the constant
degree graph for which Theorem 2.1(1) holds). The graph G can be VIED-embedded in Hypn for
n = O(logN), such that for every w ∈ {0,1}n we have4 ∣B2(w) ∩ Im(G)∣ = O(1).
Proof. We “sparse” the embedding of Lemma 3.5 to reach a situation where every pair of inde-
pendent edges are embedded to paths that are within a distance of at least 3 one from the other.
This can be done, for instance, by embedding G in a hypercube of dimension n = 3(logN + 111)
rather than dimension n′ = logN + 111, when we replace every vertex in Hypn′ by three copies of
itself. Such a change multiplies the hamming distance by a factor of 3. For such an embedding the
maximal number of vertices of Im(G) in a ball or radius 2 is obtained at a vertex w ∈ φ(VG) and
is equal to 1 + 2 ⋅ 32; the vertex and two vertices of every one of the 36 embedded edges.
We proceed with a short presentation of the arguments that prove Theorem 2.1(2) from Theorem
2.1(1), followed by a Corollary that will be essential in our reduction. The arguments below are
very similar, but yet slightly defer from the proof that is presented in Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 2.1(2) from Theorem 2.1(1). We reduce SumLS(G) to SumLS(Hypn)
using the VIED embedding (ϕ,χ) of Lemma 7.3. Let Im(G) ⊂ Hypn be the image of the embedding
and let w∗ ∈ Im(G) be some fixed vertex. Given an instance (fA, fB) of SumLS(G) we define an
instance (f ′A, f ′B) of SumLS(Hypn) by
f ′A(w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
fA(v) if w = ϕ(v) ∈ ϕ(VG)
k
l
fA(v) + l−kl fA(v′) if w ∈ χ({v, v′}) ⊂ χ(EG)
−d(w,w∗) otherwise.
f ′B(w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
fB(v) if w = ϕ(v) ∈ ϕ(VG)
k
l
fB(v) + l−kl fB(v′) if w ∈ χ({v, v′}) ⊂ χ(EG)
−d(w,w∗) otherwise.
where in the case w ∈ χ({v, v′}) we assume that w is the k’th element in the path χ({v, v′}) and
l is the total length of this path. Simply speaking, we set the functions f ′A, f
′
B to have the values
fA(v) on the embedded vertices ϕ(v). On intermediate vertices along a path that embeds an edge
we set the value to be a weighted average of the two extreme valuations. For vertices out of Im(G)
we set f ′A(w) = f ′B(w) to be a negative constant that does not depend on the instance (fA, fB).
It can be easily checked that the local maxima of f ′A + f
′
B over Hypn are precisely {ϕ(v) ∶
v is a local maximum of fA + fB over G}.
Corollary 7.4. Finding local maximum in Hypn with the promise of f
′
A(w) = f ′B(w) = −d(w,w∗)
for all w ∉ Im(G), requires 2Ω(n) communication.
Now we construct a potential game with Θ(n)-players that solves the promise SumLS problem
of Corollary 7.4.
We mimic the arguments of the previous 2
3
√
n bound with one change: the reports Ð→x andÐ→y are done on vertices in B2(v) ∩ Im(G) rather than B2(v). By Lemma 7.3 it is sufficient to
4More concretely, n = 3 logN + 333 and ∣B2(w) ∩ Im(G)∣ ≤ 73.
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report 73 vertices (rather than Θ(n2)). A report consists of Ð→x = (Ð→xv,Ð→xf) where Ð→xv is a 73-tuple
of vertices, and
Ð→
xf is a 73-tuple of valuations. The valuation function val
Ð→x (w) is modified to be
val
Ð→x (w) = val(xfi) if w = xvi for i ∈ Imin(Ð→xv); Otherwise, if w ∉ Im(G) we set valÐ→x (w) = −d(w,w∗);
Otherwise, we set val
Ð→x (w) = 0. Similarly for Bob.
We also modify the definition of the neighbour vertices of v ∈ Hypn:
N1(v) ∶= {(v1, ..., v73) ∶ {v1, ..., v73} ⊃ B1(v) ∩ Im(G)} ⊂ {0,1}73n
N2(v) ∶= {(v1, ..., v9) ∶ {v1, ..., v73} ⊃ B2(v) ∩ Im(G)} ⊂ {0,1}73n.
Note that by the Lemma 7.3 N1(v),N2(v) ≠ ∅ for all vertices v.
From here, we apply similar arguments to those in Section ?? to prove a reduction from the
local search promise problem of Corollary 7.4 to pure Nash equilibrium in potential games. The
only additional argument that is needed is that val
Ð→x , val
Ð→y have the correct valuation for all vertices
w ∉ Im(G) (in particular those within radius 2).
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A Identifying Ordinal Potential Games
We will prove two results, one for two-player N -action games and one for n-player 2 action games.
In both we use the following two-player two-action game for x, y ∈ {0,2}:
2,1 1,2
1, y x,1
This game has a better-reply cycle if and only if x = y = 2.
Proposition A.1. Recognizing whether a two-player N -action game is an ordinal potential game
requires poly(N) bits of communication, even for randomized protocols.
Proof. Denote by u′ the two-player 2N × 2N table that contains N ×N copies of this game with
the parameters (xi,j, yi,j)i,j∈[N]. We denote by u′′ the two-player 2N × 2N game with the payoffs
u′′(a, b) = (3⌈a
2
⌉,3⌈ b
2
⌉). And we denote u = u′ + u′′. The game u has a better-reply cycle if and
only if there exist i, j ∈ [N] such that xi,j = yi,j = 2. Indeed if xi,j = yi,j = 2, since we have added
a constant payoff of 3i to player 1 (3j to player 2) to the (i, j) copy of the game, the better reply
cycle remains a better reply cycle in u. If (xi,j , yi,j) ≠ (2,2) for all i, j then we have no better reply
cycle within the copies of the 2×2 games, and we have no better reply cycles across the 2×2 games
because at least one player has dominant strategy. Therefore the determination of ordinal potential
property is as hard as disjointness, which requires poly(N) communication, even with randomized
communication.
Proposition A.2. Recognizing whether an n-player 2-action game is an ordinal potential game
requires 2Ω(n) bits of communication, even for randomized protocols.
Proof. Consider an (n + 2)-player game where for each profile a ∈ {0,1}n the last two players are
playing the above 2×2 game with parameters xa, ya. For the first n players we set the utilities such
that 1 is dominant strategy (e.g., ui(ai, a−i) = ai for i ∈ [n]). Similarly to the previous arguments,
the game contains a better reply cycle if and only if xa = ya = 2 for some a ∈ {0,1}n. Again, we
obtain a reduction to disjointness.
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